IAC named causes of the disaster Boeing 737-800 in Rostov-on-Don – BBC

The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) made public the reasons for the disaster Boeing 737-800 of the company FlyDubai in Rostov-on-Don, which took place March 19, 2016. As the official statement of the IAC, actual weather in the area of ​​the airfield Rostov-on-Don at the time of the accident corresponded to the predicted weather. “The meteorological equipment used to monitor the weather parameters on the airfield Rostov-on-Don, it was believed, in good working” – said in the IAC report. Meteorological Service for the flight of the aircraft Boeing 737-800 №A6-FDN airline FlyDubai, carrying out flight from Dubai to FDB981 – Rostov-on-Don, also in line with the requirements of regulatory and guidance documents

As a result of the preliminary analysis of information from flight recorders. found that the crew carried out the landing approach in manual piloting mode (autopilot off) in adverse weather conditions (cloud base 630 m, wind 230 g. 13 m / s with gusts of 18 m / sec, weak storm rain, haze, on the line severe turbulence and moderate wind shear)

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In the course of the first approach to the 22.42 UTC at an altitude of 340 m, having received the information from the on-board system of “wind shear” (sudden change in strength and direction of the wind),

the crew decided to ” missed approach “, followed by the flight in the vicinity of the airport while waiting for the weather to improve.

in the process of re-approach, also occurs in manual mode, the crew at an altitude of 220 m ( 4 km to the WFP) once again took on the solution of the “missed approach”. At an altitude of 900 m at the same time return the crew of the wheel “by itself” aircraft stabilizer was rejected by five degrees dive,

with the result that the plane “went to the vigorous decrease with the implementation of the vertical overload to -1 units. “. Follow the crew was not allowed to prevent the collision of the aircraft with the ground.

The collision occurred at speeds exceeding 600 km / h with a pitch angle to dive more than 50 degrees.

The IAC report It notes that the aircraft pilots had valid certificates of pilots are trained, have adequate coating on this type of aircraft and all necessary documents. According to the commission, the total flight crew commander was 5965 hours, a raid on the Boeing – 2597 hours, of which as PIC – 1005 hours

Meanwhile, as found out “Newspaper.. Ru »,

Rosaviation already demanded from airlines operating Boeing, conduct training and additional training for pilots.

This is stated in newsletter (available to “Gazety.Ru”), which is spread agency

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According to the report, the supervisory authority recommends that heads of civil aviation organizations operating aircraft Voeing-737 all modifications, re-examine the flight crews with a missed approach procedure. It is also proposed to be included in the training of aircrew training on a regular simulator FFS, testing of crew actions for the conclusion of a complex aircraft attitude and practicing missed.

In addition, it was recommended to re-examine the accident investigation materials aircraft Voeing-737 of airline “Tatarstan” in Kazan airport in November 2013. According to employees of Federal Air Transport Agency, the accident is similar to Rostov.

Then the crew of the aircraft, going to the second round because of the adverse weather conditions, and brought the aircraft on for critical angles of attack and “dropping” it into resulting loss of speed and further uncoordinated actions of pilots.

In the course of the investigation of the accident experiment was conducted on the simulator aircraft-simulator for transfer into the second round. The experiment involved 11 experienced pilots, but coped with the task of only four people. In the experiment, was attended by the pilots of five Russian airlines with different years of experience and professional status (FAC instructor, PIC, co-pilot), including pilots, past retraining of navigators and flight engineers.

During the tests it was found out, that

for his flying practice real go-around was performed only seven pilots (one to four departures).

four pilot all such practices in real-world flights had. Testing activities with the missed approach is performed on the simulator, and basically worked through treatment with low height (CDF) and mostly on one engine. Caring for the second round with an intermediate height in the practice of training, according to the pilots, was not used. As a result, none of the pilots did not respond correctly to all seven questions concerning the logic of the joint work of automatic systems of the aircraft, and four, remembering his school years, attempted to use “cheat sheets” on mobile devices.

«Moreover, after the execution mode of care on the simulator two pilots argued that a missed approach is automatic, that is under autopilot (and this is when working on disabling the autopilot alarm!). This reflects both a lack of the necessary level of knowledge, and the gap between the theoretical knowledge and practical skills, “- throws up his hands IAC.

One pilot (and twice!) Has not been able to cope with the management of the care on the second round and actually brought the car to stall, as well as pilots of the crashed Boeing in Kazan.